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 RECONSIDERING THE STANDARD FOR 
ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT CASES IN 
VIEW OF RECENT GUIDANCE FROM THE 
SUPREME COURT 
Howard Wisnia† & Thomas Jackman†† 
This article examines whether the jurisprudence of the enhanced 
damages provision found in 35 U.S.C. § 284 should be modified in light 
of recent Supreme Court decisions that have altered the jurispudence 
of the attorney’s fees provision found in 35 U.S.C. § 285. The authors 
conclude that a revision is needed to the standard for determining 
whether to award enchanced damages under § 284 and that juries as 
opposed to judges should determine whether to grant such an award as 
well as the amount of the award. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Octane Fitness, LLC v. 
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc.1 and Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health 
Management Systems, Inc.2 significantly modified the jurisprudence 
for determining whether a patent lawsuit is “exceptional,” thus 
qualifying the prevailing party for attorney’s fees under § 285 of the 
Patent Act.3 These two decisions addressed the Federal Circuit’s multi-
year jurisprudence on the appropriate standard of proof4 for 
 
 1. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). 
 2. Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014). 
 3. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2013) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney 
fees to the prevailing party.”). 
 4. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245 n.4 (2011) (discussing how 
the term “burden of proof” has been used synonymously with “standard of proof,” but that the 
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exceptional-case determinations under § 285 and their proper 
characterization as either a question of fact or law. In discussing § 285, 
the Supreme Court did not mention § 284, the damages provision of the 
Patent Act that provides for the recovery of “damages adequate to 
compensate for the infringement”5 and increased damages for willful 
infringement.6 Courts have historically treated the discretionary-
damage awards of § 284 and § 285 similarly, often citing precedent 
concerning one section in the application of the other.7 The reasoning 
in Octane Fitness and Highmark suggests that current Federal Circuit 
§ 284 jurisprudence should be modified.8 Specifically, willfulness need 
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence (as opposed to clear 
and convincing evidence), and is a question of fact entirely for the jury. 
This article also concludes that there is a Seventh Amendment right to 
have the jury perform the discretionary adjustment of damages under 
§ 284. Finally, this article considers the implications of these 
modifications to § 284 jurisprudence. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT MODIFIES THE JURISPRUDENCE OF  
35 U.S.C. § 285 
A. Octane Fitness 
In Octane, the Supreme Court revised the application of 35 U.S.C 
§ 285, a fee-shifting provision for patent litigation to be applied in 
“exceptional” cases.9 The parties in Octane were manufacturers of 
exercise equipment.10 ICON sued Octane for patent infringement, but 
lost on summary judgment for non-infringement.11 Octane then moved 
 
Supreme Court uses “standard of proof” to specify “how difficult it will be for the party bearing 
the burden of persuasion to convince the jury of the facts in its favor”). 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013). 
 6. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Absent a statutory 
guide, we have held that an award of enhanced damages requires a showing of willful 
infringement.”). 
 7. See, e.g., iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
objective baselessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys' fees against a non-prevailing 
plaintiff . . . is identical to the objective recklessness standard for enhanced damages and attorneys' 
fees against an accused infringer for § 284 willful infringement actions.”); Bard Peripheral 
Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (same).  
 8. A concurring opinion in a post-Octane Fitness/Highmark Federal Circuit decision on 
willfulness agrees that § 284 jurisprudence requires further review in light of the Supreme Court’s 
changes to § 285 jurisprudence. See Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 9. 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014); 35 U.S.C § 285 (2013). 
 10. 134 S. Ct. at 1754. 
 11. Id. at 1755. 
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for attorney’s fees under § 285, but the district court, applying existing 
Federal Circuit jurisprudence, declined to award fees because ICON’s 
claim was not “objectively baseless” or “brought in subjective bad 
faith.”12 The Federal Circuit affirmed and declined to “revisit the settled 
standard for exceptionality.”13  
The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Court’s decision, finding 
that the “objectively baseless” and “brought in subjective bad faith” 
requirements were inconsistent with the statute.14 The Supreme Court 
also suggested that preponderance of the evidence, not clear and 
convincing evidence,” was the proper standard of proof under § 285.15 
It explained that the “simple discretionary inquiry” required by § 285 
did not impose “a specific evidentiary burden, much less such a high 
one.”16 The Supreme Court noted that “patent-infringement litigation 
has always been governed by a preponderance of the evidence,” as this 
standard “allows both parties to share the risk of error in roughly equal 
fashion.”17 Significantly, the Supreme Court found that the analytical 
framework of Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia 
Pictures Industries, Inc. (PRE), which was the foundation of the 
Federal Circuit’s construction of § 285, had “no roots in the text of 
§ 285.”18 Important to our inquiry, the Federal Circuit had also been 
relying on PRE in its § 284 analysis,19 despite the fact that PRE deals 
with the “sham” exception to the doctrine of antitrust immunity for 
petitioning the government and the Supreme court has now suggested 
it is not relevant to patent law. 20 
B. Highmark 
In Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc.,21 
released the same day as Octane, the Supreme Court found that the 
Federal Circuit had applied the wrong standard of review to the district 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F. App’x 57, 65 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
 14. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1756–57. 
 15. Id. at 1758. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. (citations omitted). 
 18. Id. at 1757 (discussing Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 
Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993)). 
 19. See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing PRE as support for its holding with respect to § 284); PRE, 508 U.S. at 
49–50. 
 20. Octane Fitness, 134 S. Ct. at 1757. 
 21. Id. at 1744 (2014). 
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court’s § 285 findings.22 The accused infringer, Highmark, had moved 
for attorney’s fees under § 285 after prevailing on its motion for 
summary judgment for non-infringement.23 The district court granted 
the motion for attorney’s fees, but the Federal Circuit reversed, 
applying de novo review to the district court’s findings.24 The Supreme 
Court found that the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion 
because, “[a]lthough questions of law may in some cases be relevant to 
the § 285 inquiry, that inquiry general is, at heart, rooted in factual 
determinations.”25 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of § 285 suggests that the Federal 
Circuit has applied the wrong standard of proof under 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
These decisions also suggest that the recent shift by the Federal Circuit 
to treat willfulness determinations as a matter of law is incorrect.26 
This article examines the history of treble damages for patent 
infringement in the U.S., attempts to locate the source of the clear-and-
convincing standard required by current Federal Circuit jurisprudence 
for obtaining these damages, and explores the jurisprudence behind 
similar willfulness provisions to see if clear and convincing evidence 
is the appropriate standard of proof for awarding enhanced damages. 
This article also examines the propriety of the Federal Circuit’s recent 
treatment of willfulness as a question of law instead of a question of 
fact.  
II. THE HISTORY OF ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT CASES 
Enhanced damages for patent infringement dates back to 1793 in 
the U.S., just three years after the first session of the U.S. Congress 
passed the Patent Act of 1790.27 The Patent Act of 1793 set 
infringement damages as “a sum, that shall be at least equal to three 
times the price, for which the patentee has usually sold or licensed to 
 
 22. Id. at 1749. 
 23. Id. at 1747. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 1749 (citations omitted). 
 26. See, e.g., Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1006–
07 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that a proper willfulness determination is at least partially a matter 
of law, with the court acting as a gatekeeper for the issue); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse 
Elecs., Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (O’Malley, J., concurring and observing that 
the jurisprudence of § 284 is potentially in need of reform). As discussed below, Judge O’Malley’s 
suggestion that enhanced damages should be a matter entirely for the judge may be inconsistent 
with the Seventh Amendment. See infra Part IV(A). 
 27. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2013)); Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790). 
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other persons, the use of the said invention.”28 This mandatory trebling 
remained largely unaltered until the Patent Act of 1836, which provided 
that once a patentee obtained a favorable verdict, “it shall be in the 
power of the court to render judgment for any sum above the amount 
found by such verdict as the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff, 
not exceeding three times the amount thereof.”29 The provision for 
discretionary enhanced damages has remained part of the Patent Act 
ever since.30 The current provision provides that once a patentee has 
obtained a finding of infringement, the court may “increase the 
damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”31  
III. THE HISTORY BEHIND THE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE 
STANDARD OF PROOF FOR WILLFULNESS DETERMINATIONS  
A. The Federal Circuit Era 
The history of requiring clear and convincing evidence of willful 
infringement to obtain enhanced damages under § 284 is not nearly as 
straightforward as the history of § 284 itself. Nothing in 35 U.S.C. 
§ 284 or its predecessors mentions a particular standard of proof. Yet 
the Federal Circuit has required clear and convincing evidence of 
willful infringement for enhanced damages under § 284 for almost 30 
years.32  
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., decided in 
1985, three years after the Federal Circuit was established, is the 
genesis of this requirement in the Federal Circuit.33 The court stated 
that “[t]he jurisprudence . . . uniformly requires clear and convincing 
evidence in support of increased damages.”34 Yet, the Shatterproof 
court cited no support for its holding. Nonetheless, future Federal 
Circuit decisions on the issue all cite backwards in a chain to 
Shatterproof.35  
 
 28. Patent Act of 1793 § 5, 1 Stat. at 322. 
 29. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 14, 5 Stat. 117, 123 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2013)). 
 30. This provision was last modified by the Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 284, 
66 Stat. 792, 813 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 284). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013). 
 32. See, e.g., Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 628 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc); Bard 
Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(citing SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997), Pall 
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The exception is Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 
decided in 1986, one year after Shatterproof.36 The parties had 
submitted jointly prepared questions to the jury in the district court, 
which the Federal Circuit held “recognized the appropriate burdens to 
be met by each of the parties as well as the corresponding standard of 
proof with respect to each issue.”37 One of these questions stated that 
the standard of proof for willful infringement was the preponderance 
of the evidence.38 The significance of this holding was quickly 
diminished by E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., decided in 1988, in which the court “conclude[d] that 
Orthokinetics never intended to change the proper test stated in 
Shatterproof.”39 Nonetheless, it suggests that not all judges initially 
agreed (or assumed) that clear and convincing was the appropriate 
standard.  
B. The Pre-Federal Circuit Era 
In searching for the uniform jurisprudence of Shatterproof, a 
review of the preceding two-hundred years of patent cases revealed that 
courts have historically found evidence of willful infringement to be 
either sufficient or insufficient without explaining the specific 
evidentiary standard of proof it applied.40 By the mid-20th century, 
courts began discussing which party bore the burden of proof (i.e., that 
the burden was on the patentee to show willful infringement), but had 
not yet addressed the evidentiary standard.41 
 
Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995), E.I. du Pont de Nemours 
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988), Shatterproof, 758 F.2d at 
628). 
 36. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 37. Id. at 1569. 
 38. Id. at 1583. 
 39. 849 F.2d 1430, 1440 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 40. See, e.g., Allen v. Deacon, 21 F. 122, 123 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (“I do not think the 
infringement after notice in question is of such a willful nature as to incur the penalty of a recovery 
for all prior infringements without notice of the patent.”); Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 704 
(1890) (stating, without discussing the appropriate standard of proof, that “[i]t is conceded that 
these exceptions raise two points, namely, that the infringement was not willful [sic].”); Lowell 
Mfg. Co. v. Hogg, 70 F. 787, 787 (C.C.D. Mass. 1895) (holding, without a discussion of the 
standard of proof, that “under the circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that his 
infringements were willful.”); Phila. Rubber Works Co. v. U.S. Rubber Reclaiming Works, 276 F. 
600, 609 (D.N.Y. 1920) (holding, without stating the standard of proof, that “I am unable to sustain 
plaintiff’s claim the infringement in question was wanton and willful.”); Muther v. United Shoe 
Mach. Co., 21 F.2d 773, 780 (D. Mass. 1927) (holding, without stating the standard of proof, that 
“[t]he infringement was willful, deliberate, and intentional, and a case seems to be presented for 
the exercise of the discretionary power of the court to increase plaintiff’s legal damages.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Artmoore Co. v. Dayless Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 1, 5 (7th Cir. 1953). 
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In its 1982 decision Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Lab.,42 the 
Seventh Circuit lumped § 285 and § 284 together and stated, “such 
awards are not to be given to a prevailing party as a matter of course 
but only upon an ‘unambiguous showing of extraordinary 
misconduct.’”43 This holding implies a higher evidentiary standard than 
preponderance of the evidence. 
The Novo court cited a 1972 Seventh Circuit opinion, Airtex Corp 
v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., to support its holding.44 However, the 
Airtex case concerned a request for attorney fees under § 285, not 
enhanced damages under § 284.45 The Airtex court relied on a line of 
cases46 that all converged on the idea that since fraud must be proven 
by clear and convincing evidence, it is also the correct standard for 
obtaining attorney’s fees because the request is often supported by 
allegations of fraud.47 Airtex agreed with this reasoning despite 
acknowledging that the “exceptional case” justification under § 285 is 
not limited to fraud.48 
A close look at the first case in this line, Armour & Co. v. Wilson 
& Co.,49 reveals that the later cases interpreted it incorrectly. Armour 
examined whether an award of attorney fees was appropriate in the 
context of accusations of inequitable conduct and fraud by the 
patentee.50 The court in Armour first overturned findings related to 
fraud, concluding that the evidence put forth failed to meet the “clear 
and convincing evidence” standard.51 The court then overturned the 
district court’s award of fees because “the basis of this award was not 
clearly stated” as required and that in any event there was “no proper 
basis for an award of attorney fees in this case.”52 It never mentioned 
the appropriate standard of proof required to obtain attorney fees under 
§ 285. 
 
 42. 677 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 43. Novo Industri, 677 F.2d at 1211 (emphasis added) (quoting Airtex Corp. v. Shelley 
Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 155 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Airtex, 536 F.2d at 155. 
 46. Id. (citing Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs., Inc., 484 F.2d 905, 
909 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing Sarkes Tarizan, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 351 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1965) 
(citing Armour & Co. v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 274 F.2d 143, 148 (7th Cir. 1960)))). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 274 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1960).  
 50. Armour, 274 F.2d at 148. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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While Armour held that fraud and inequitable conduct must be 
shown by clear and convincing evidence,53 it lends no support for the 
proposition that fee awards under § 285, much less treble damages 
under § 284, require clear and convincing evidence. The cases that 
followed Armour were wrong for citing it for such a proposition. Novo 
compounded the error by citing Airtex as a basis that both § 284 and 
§ 285 require a higher standard of proof.54 
C. The Federal Circuit Likely Adopted an Incorrect Standard of 
Proof 
It is one thing to require a party to show egregious or malicious 
behavior meriting fees or treble damages. It is quite another to require 
that this egregious behavior be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence as opposed to the preponderance of the evidence. The first 
requirement ensures consideration of the kinds of improper behavior 
envisioned by the statute. The second requirement deals with the risk 
of error, which is an entirely different issue. The Supreme Court 
reiterated in Octane that preponderance of the evidence is the 
appropriate standard of proof in patent litigation because the risk of 
error under § 285 should be shared equally between the plaintiff and 
the defendant.55 Section 284 should be treated the same in this respect. 
This is further supported by a review of analogous provisions, which 
show that the law expects parties to share the risks of litigating 
willfulness. 
D. The Standard of Proof for Willfulness in Other Contexts is 
Preponderance of the Evidence 
Federal trademark law provides for the recovery of attorney’s 
fees, increased damages, and the defendant’s profits for willful 
infringement.56 In Fishman Transducers, Inc. v. Paul, the First Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether willfulness should be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence.57 
The court noted that “authority in other circuits is divided on whether 
in Lanham Act cases to equate fraud or willfulness with a heightened 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Novo Industri A/S v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 677 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing 
Airtex Corp. v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 155 (7th Cir. 1976)). 
 55. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2013). 
 57. 684 F.3d 187, 190–93 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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standard of proof”58 and concluded that preponderance of the evidence 
was the proper standard.59 The Fishman court reasoned that “the 
ordinary rule in civil cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence” 
where “the text of [the statute] does not prescribe a different burden of 
proof.”60 The court noted that even though fraud was “a cousin to 
willfulness” and was historically shown by clear and convincing 
evidence, “the modern tendency in the Supreme Court is to reserve the 
clear and convincing burden, unless dictated by statute, for matters with 
constitutional implications like civil commitment.”61 Citing various 
Supreme Court decisions for support, the Fishman court observed that 
preponderance of the evidence was the appropriate standard for the 
“imposition of even severe civil sanctions.”62 
Copyright law also provides for increased damages for willful 
infringement.63 As with trademark infringement, courts only require a 
preponderance of the evidence to establish that infringement was 
willful.64 Various courts have found willfulness provisions elsewhere 
to require only a preponderance of the evidence, including willful and 
malicious injury caused to a debtor,65 willful misappropriation of trade 
secrets,66 willful violation of the EPA,67 willful violation of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act,68 and willful discrimination.69 
 
 58. Id. at 193. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 192 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387 (1983)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 193 (emphasis added) (citing Herman, 459 U.S. at 390 (1983) (anti-fraud 
provision of the Securities Exchange Act); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291 (1991) 
(Bankruptcy Code fraud provision)). 
 63. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2013). 
 64. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Cable, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 685 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (explaining that plaintiff must prove willful copyright infringement by a 
preponderance of the evidence); Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions Civil 17.27 
(2007), available at http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD 
/Civil_Jury_Instructions_2014_6.pdf. 
 65. Ahern v. Brackney (In re Brackney), 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 958, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 
Mar. 14, 2013). 
 66. Agilent Techs. v. Kirkland, 2010 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, at *67 (Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2010). 
 67. Manual of Model Civil Jury Instructions, Eighth Circuit 6.20 (2013), available at 
http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/Manual_Civil_Jury_Inst_FJPI8CIV_2013_ed.pdf. 
 68. Rodriguez v. Farm Stores Grocery, Inc., 518 F.3d 1259, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008). 
 69. Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions Civil 11.7B (2007), available at 
http://www3.ce9.uscourts.gov/jury-instructions/sites/default/files/WPD/Civil_Jury_Instructions_ 
2014_6.pdf. 
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E. The Punitive Nature of Treble Damages Does Not Support 
the Use of the Clear and Convincing Evidence 
Standard of Proof 
Certain decisions post-Shatterproof have attempted to support the 
adoption of a clear and convincing standard on the theory that treble 
damages are typically awarded only in punitive cases, which require a 
higher standard of proof.70 The Supreme Court has specifically rejected 
this notion, stating that “[t]here has never been any general common-
law rule that the threshold for punitive damages must always be higher 
than that for compensatory liability.”71 The Sixth Circuit also rejected 
this position in White v. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railroad Co.72 
As the White court observed, the concern that punitive damages will be 
assessed against the wrong party is addressed by the state of mind 
required, not the evidentiary standard.73 Just because the law punishes 
malicious behavior it does not necessarily demand a higher standard of 
proof to show the existence of that behavior. As for § 284, the Federal 
Circuit has already addressed the question of the type of behavior that 
subjects a party to possible treble damages by raising the required 
showing for willfulness from a standard that was “more akin to 
negligence” to [objective] recklessness.74  
F. Statutory Adoption Does Not Support the Clear and 
Convincing Evidence Standard of Proof 
Supreme Court guidance provides another potential reason to 
deviate from the assumption that preponderance of the evidence is the 
proper standard under § 284: statutory adoption.75 Statutory adoption 
occurs when Congress, in choosing to use particular language in a 
 
 70. See, e.g., Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(“Thus willful infringement must be established by clear and convincing evidence, for it is a 
punitive finding, and can have the consequence of multiplication of damages.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 71. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 53 (1983). 
 72. 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“The dissenting opinion states that punitive 
damages are an unconventional form of relief and therefore deserve a heightened standard of 
proof. Unquestionably, punitive damages serve a different purpose than compensatory damages. 
The requirement that punitive damages be awarded only when a defendant acts maliciously or 
recklessly recognizes this difference in purpose and ensures that punitive damages will be awarded 
only in the most egregious cases. Punitive damages are not, however, unconventional in the sense 
that they are a new or nontraditional form of relief. In fact, punitive damages have a long history 
in American civil litigation, where the traditional standard of proof has been ‘preponderance of 
the evidence.’”). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 75. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2245–46 (2011). 
JACKMAN & WISNIA EDITS.DOCX 5/11/2015 2:08 PM 
472 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 31 
statute, incorporates the established common-law meaning of that 
language.76 This established meaning might imply a higher standard in 
the common law. The Supreme Court examined this in the context of 
the standard of proof for invalidating a patent in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i 
Ltd. Partnership.77 In that case, Microsoft argued that nothing in the 
statute required a defendant to invalidate a patent by clear and 
convincing evidence.78 The Court noted that 35 U.S.C. § 282 contained 
a “presumed validity” of patents and this language was directly adopted 
from a prior Supreme Court decision that had required a higher 
standard to invalidate a patent.79 By adopting the same “presumed 
valid” language in the Patent Act of 1952, the Court concluded that 
Congress must have adopted the common law meaning that patents 
could only be invalidated upon a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence.80 
An examination of § 284 reveals no special language regarding a 
presumption or the presence of any other legal construct that would 
indicate that Congress had adopted a common law standard of proof 
that deviated from the default preponderance of the evidence. The 
increased damages provision of § 284 merely dictates that the court 
“may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed.”81 In fact, § 284 does not mention willful infringement at all, 
which has led at least one Federal Circuit Judge to argue that the willful 
infringement requirement was improperly “engraft[ed]” onto § 284 and 
that the decision to enhance damages should simply be left to the 
discretion of the district court.82 Also, the statute does not contain any 
language that was adopted by Congress from court cases that required 
a higher standard of proof in order to obtain treble damages. The purely 
discretionary nature of the language indicates the opposite, as the 
Supreme Court similarly concluded in Octane Fitness with respect to 
§ 285.83 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 2245–52. 
 78. Id. at 2244. 
 79. Id. at 2245–46. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013). 
 82. Id.; In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Gajarsa, J., 
concurring). 
 83. Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1758 (2014). 
MAY 11 2015 JACKMAN WISNIA 284 EDITS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/11/2015 2:08 PM 
2015] ENHANCED DAMAGES IN PATENT LAW 473 
IV. SECTION 284 ENHANCED DAMAGES DETERMINATION IS AN ISSUE 
OF FACT 
The Federal Circuit has traditionally treated enhanced damages 
under § 284 as a two prong issue: first, a determination is made of the 
factual predicate for enhanced damages, typically willful 
infringement,84 and second, a discretionary determination is made as to 
the amount, if any, of enhanced damages to be awarded, up to a 
statutory maximum of three times the original award.85 Supreme Court 
analysis on the awarding of damages in intellectual property 
infringement cases suggests that both of these prongs, contrary to the 
current practice, should be determined by a jury.  
A. The Factual Predicate of Whether the Infringement was 
Willful Is a Pure Question of Fact 
Historically, courts, including the Federal Circuit, have treated the 
willfulness determination under § 284 as entirely a question of fact for 
the jury.86 However, the Federal Circuit recently began treating the 
willfulness determination as a partial question of law for the court as 
opposed to entirely a question of fact for the jury.87 In Bard Peripheral 
Vascular v. W.L. Gore & Associates, while acknowledging that, “[t]he 
ultimate question of willfulness has long been treated as a question of 
fact,” the Federal Circuit stated that Seagate—which required an 
objective analysis of whether an infringer acted reasonably in 
considering willfulness—required a modification to the § 284 
analysis.88 The Bard court noted that this analysis requires an 
“assessment of potential defenses based on the risk presented by the 
patent,” which might entail questions of validity that “are not 
necessarily dependent on the factual circumstances of the particular 
party accused of infringement.”89 The court then cited Miller v. Fenton 
and Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. for the proposition that 
sometimes mixed questions of fact and law are treated as a question of 
law where “[the court] is better positioned to decide the issue in 
 
 84. There is some disagreement as to whether a showing of willfulness is necessary for 
obtaining enhanced damages under § 284, but that is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., 
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1377 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) (stating that the Federal Circuit has erred by 
limiting enhanced damages to findings of willful infringement).  
 85. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1368. 
 86. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc., 682 F.3d 1003, 1004–06 
(Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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question.”90 The Bard court concluded that willfulness should be 
treated as a two-part analysis, the first part of which may be a question 
of law to be handled by the judge, because “the court is in the best 
position for making the determination of reasonableness even . . . 
though predicated on underlying mixed questions of law and fact.”91 
1. The Bard Court Failed to Engage in the Necessary 
Seventh Amendment Analysis 
While the Bard court cited Markman as support for its holding that 
mixed questions of fact and law are sometimes appropriate for the 
judge, it failed to engage in the Seventh Amendment analysis 
conducted in Markman. First, one must inquire whether there was a 
common law right to have a jury decide the issue that existed prior to 
the Seventh Amendment, which was passed in 1791.92 A review of pre-
Seventh Amendment law does not reveal whether a jury was expected 
to determine if patent infringement was willful.93 However, an 
examination of willful infringement decisions after 1791 shows that 
there has never been even a mild debate about who should decide 
willfulness.94 It has always been a question of fact for the jury. 
Additionally, because willful infringement is merely a type of 
infringement, one would expect that a jury would determine this 
issue.95 That the issue of willfulness in patent infringement litigation 
directly relates to the damages awarded makes it even more likely to 
fall under the purview of the jury. As discussed by the Supreme Court 
in Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., “there is 
overwhelming evidence that the consistent practice at common law 
[prior to 1791] was for juries to award damages.”96  
 
 90. Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113–14 (1985)); Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)). 
 91. Id. at 1006–07. 
 92. Markman, 517 U.S. at 376. 
 93. See, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Commentary: Willful Patent Infringement and the Federal 
Circuit’s Pending En Banc Decision in Knorr-Bremse v. Dana Corp, 3 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 218, 224 (2004) (reviewing pre-1791 patent law including all the patent cases cited in 
Markman and finding no mention of a jury being asked to determine if infringement was willful). 
 94. See, e.g., Studiengesellschaft Kohle m.b.H. v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1573 
(Fed. Cir. 1988); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 
Hammerquist v. Clarke’s Sheet Metal, Inc., 658 F.2d 1319, 1325–26 (9th Cir. 1981) (commenting 
that “willful infringement involves a mental state peculiarly within the realm of jury judgment”). 
 95. Markman, 517 U.S. at 377 (“[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must 
be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”). 
 96. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353–54 (1998). 
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Because there is no direct corollary to pre-1791 patent law, which 
lacks an analogous willfulness provision, a review of the closest 18th-
century analogue is the next step,97 which in this case appears to be 
willful copyright infringement.98 In Feltner v. Columbia Pictures, the 
Supreme Court examined whether “the Seventh Amendment grants a 
right to a jury trial when a copyright owner elects to recover statutory 
damages.”99 This case dealt with damages that were awarded upon a 
finding of “willful infringement.”100 After engaging in exactly the same 
analysis it performed in Markman, the Court found that “the Seventh 
Amendment provides a right to a jury trial on all issues pertinent to an 
award of statutory damages under § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, 
including the amount itself.”101 Critically, this holding was based on the 
Court’s finding that there was a common law, pre-Seventh Amendment 
right to have a jury determine and set damages in a copyright dispute.102 
Such a finding suggests that the factfinder should also be the entity 
responsible for determining whether patent infringement is willful. 
This would be consistent with willfulness determinations in other areas 
of law.103  
Bard’s holding also goes directly against a long tradition of 
leaving questions of reasonableness to the factfinder. The Supreme 
Court has observed that reasonableness is ultimately a question of fact 
by recognizing the “jury’s unique competence in applying the 
‘reasonable man’ standard.”104 The Federal Circuit has also recognized 
the role the jury has in determining whether an infringer had a 
reasonable belief that accused activity did not violate the law.105  
 
 97. Markman, 517 U.S. at 379–80. 
 98. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US 417(1984) (looking 
to patent law where there was no precedent in the copyright law “because of the historic kinship 
between patent law and copyright law”); In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (en banc) (looking to willful infringement in the copyright context in an effort to understand 
the proper application of willful infringement in the patent context).  
 99. Feltner, 523 U.S. at 342. 
 100. Id. at 345–46.  
 101. Id. at 355 (emphasis added). 
 102. Id. at 349–55. 
 103. See, e.g., Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 449, 461–62 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(affirming a jury’s finding of willfulness in a trade dress infringement suit); Segrets, Inc. v. 
Gillman Knitwear Co., Inc., 207 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 827 (2000) 
(remanding the issue of willfulness in a copyright case so that a jury could determine it). 
 104. TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 n.12 (1976). 
 105. See Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
(“Whether the infringer had a reasonable belief that the accused activity did not violate the law is 
a question of fact, as are other questions relevant to the issue of willfulness.”) (citations omitted); 
see also Rand v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 295 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1961) (emphasizing that 
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To justify its departure from longstanding tradition, Bard cites to 
previous findings by the Federal Circuit that the objective prong 
applied in § 284 is the same as the one applied in § 285 and that § 285 
“must be interpreted against the background of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in [PRE].”106 In PRE, the court analogized “sham litigation” 
to “a lack of probable cause to institute an unsuccessful civil 
lawsuit.”107 The Bard court took this one step further by observing that 
in the criminal context the Supreme Court has held that “probable 
cause” is subject to de novo review even though it deals with questions 
of both fact and law.108 
As discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Octane that the 
analytical framework of PRE is not applicable to § 285.109 This finding 
undermines Bard’s belief that PRE’s connection to § 285 supports its 
holding with respect to § 284. Moreover, the Court’s Highmark 
decision, which found that “the § 285 inquiry . . . is, at heart, rooted in 
factual determinations,”110 in no way supports Bard’s suggestion that 
willfulness is a partial legal question for the court. The Bard court fails 
to provide a sufficient basis for changing what “has long been treated 
as a question of fact”111 to a question of law simply because the 
standard has increased from negligence to recklessness. 
B. The Discretionary Award of Enhanced Damages Is an Issue 
for the Jury 
The determination, upon a finding of willful patent infringement, 
of whether to enhance damages and in what amount is currently viewed 
as a task for the judge.112 At first glance, this appears to be consistent 
with the statute that provides “the court may increase the damages up 
to three times the amount found or assessed.”113 However, a similar 
analysis as the one done for the first prong of the enhanced damages 
test under § 284 suggests that this discretionary determination is also a 
task for the jury. Specifically, the Supreme Court in Feltner considered 
 
“when dissimilar inferences may be drawn from undisputed facts, or when the facts are in dispute, 
‘reasonableness’ is a jury question”). 
 106. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. WL Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1007 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (citing iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 107. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49, 62–63 
(1993). 
 108. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1008 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697–98 (1996)). 
 109. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1757. 
 110. Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1749. 
 111. Bard, 682 F.3d at 1006. 
 112. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 113. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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whether there was a Seventh Amendment right to have a jury determine 
copyright statutory damages, which included potential enhancement 
for willful infringement.114 The relevant copyright statute contained 
similar language to § 284 stating “[i]n a case where the copyright owner 
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that infringement 
was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the 
award of statutory damages.”115 The Supreme Court found “[t]he word 
‘court’ in this context appears to mean judge, not jury.”116 The Supreme 
Court thus held that it “discern[ed] no statutory right to a jury trial when 
a copyright owner elects to recover statutory damages. Accordingly, we 
must reach the constitutional question.”117  
The Court then went through the historical analysis described 
above and concluded that there was a constitutional right to a jury on 
the question. Specifically, the court found that before 1791 damages in 
intellectual property cases were set by a jury.118 This fact led the Feltner 
court to conclude that even though the statute on willful copyright 
infringement directs the “court” to determine the amount of damages 
to award the plaintiff, under the Seventh Amendment there is a 
constitutional right to have the jury make this determination.119  
Despite the fact that § 504(c) of the Copyright Act, 120 as written, 
appeared to be unconstitutional, it was not stricken. Rather, it has 
merely been interpreted with the judicial gloss that, despite its actual 
text, there is a right to have a jury determine the statutory damages.121 
In rejecting the argument that statutory copyright damages were no 
longer available because the Supreme Court had struck the statute as 
unconstitutional in Feltner, the Ninth Circuit held:  
According to Feltner, if the Court finds that § 504(c) [of the 
Copyright Act] is constitutionally infirm because it fails to provide 
for a jury trial, then the Court must strike down § 504(c) in its 
entirety and wait for Congress to re-enact § 504(c) with a jury trial 
provision included. This argument fails to understand the Supreme 
Court's holding in this case. In Feltner, the Supreme Court held that 
 
 114. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347–53 (1998). 
 115. Id. at 343–44. 
 116. Id. at 346. 
 117. Id. at 347. 
 118. Id. at 351–53.  
 119. Id. at 353–56 (“The right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury determine the 
amount of statutory damages, if any, awarded to the copyright owner.”) (emphasis in original). 
 120. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2013). 
 121. See, e.g., Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Krypton Broad., 259 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 
2001) (the appeal following the remand to the trial court for a jury trial on damages following the 
Supreme Court’s Feltner decision). 
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§ 504(c) provides a remedy for copyright infringement, and the 
Seventh Amendment provides a right to a jury trial when that 
remedy is at issue.122 
Given the strong historical and statutory correlation between 
patent and copyright law, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Feltner does 
not leave a lot of room for a different conclusion as it relates to the 
discretionary determination of the damage amount under § 284.123 
Accordingly, the entire § 284 inquiry is likely a matter for the jury. 
Moreover, § 284 should not be struck, but simply interpreted to 
preserve the right to a jury, as has been done post-Feltner. 
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LOWERING THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD 
FOR WILLFULNESS AND PUTTING THE RELATED DISCRETIONARY 
QUESTIONS IN THE HANDS OF THE JURY 
Lowering the evidentiary standard from clear and convincing to a 
preponderance of the evidence has the obvious effect—all else being 
equal—of making it more likely that a patent holder will be able to 
make a willfulness showing. Allowing juries instead of judges to decide 
whether to award enhanced damages and, if so, the amount has other 
implications. The most significant potential impacts fall under two 
main categories: (1) the change in litigation tactics used to defend 
against claims of willful infringement and (2) the change in the 
expected outcome of these pursuits. 
A. The Potential Change in Litigation Tactics 
Litigation tactics are likely to change if juries decide the question 
of enhanced damages under § 284. This is due to the fact that the 
defendant’s litigation conduct has historically been considered in 
setting such damages. Read v. Portec set out nine factors to be 
considered, including “the infringer’s behavior in the litigation.”124 If 
 
 122. Id. at 1192. 
 123. One alternative to viewing § 284, as it is currently written, as unconstitutional is to read 
“court” as referring to the jury, a route Justice Scalia chose to take. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 356 
(Scalia, J., concurring). 
 124. The other Read factors include: 
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of another; (2) 
whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent, investigated the patent 
and formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; (3) 
the infringer’s size and financial condition; (4) the closeness of the case; (5) the 
duration of the misconduct; (6) the remedial action by the infringer; (7) the 
infringer’s motivation for harm; and (8) whether the infringer attempted to conceal 
its misconduct. 
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defendants know that a jury will be considering their litigation behavior 
in the context of enhanced damages they will likely shift their behavior. 
Judges, unlike juries, are likely immunized to a certain extent by some 
of the more abusive litigation tactics that parties use. Defendants may 
curb the common practice of asserting every conceivable defense and 
position pre-trial only to dramatically narrow their case at trial to a 
small subset of these issues. For example, it is common for defendants 
to assert dozens if not hundreds of prior art references pre-trial, but only 
assert one to three of them at trial. It may be more difficult for an 
infringer to explain to a jury that it truly believed the patent was invalid 
or not infringed after abandoning dozens of “defenses” pre-trial. This 
concern may make bifurcation of willfulness more likely as well. 
Another possible shift in behavior relates to a second Read factor: 
“whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent, investigated 
the patent and formed a good-faith belief that it was invalid or that it 
was not infringed.”125 While judges routinely apply Knorr-Bremse, 
which removed the adverse inference that a legal opinion on 
infringement would have been unfavorable if an attorney was not 
consulted as to infringement,126 parties may believe that a jury might 
be less capable of engaging in such a legal fiction. Defendants thus 
might be more inclined to present evidence of consultation with outside 
counsel to a jury—risking potential waiver—than if a judge was the 
decision maker. 
Finally, defendants might curtail or modify their behavior during 
litigation because of the perception that juries are more likely to utilize 
punitive measures and implement these measures to a greater degree.127 
This might motivate defendants to try harder to establish they were the 
more reasonable party in the litigation and need not be punished. This 
raises another question: how will an increased reliance on juries impact 
the outcome of disputes over willful infringement and enhanced 
damages? 
 
Spectralytics, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 649 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (summarizing the factors 
found in Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826–27 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1347 
(Fed. Cir. 2004); see also 35 U.S.C. § 298 (2013). 
 127. See, e.g., Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges and Juries 
Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2004). 
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B. Potential Changes as to the Likelihood and Size of Enhanced 
Damages 
Relying on a jury instead of a judge for determining enhanced 
damages has the potential to change the likelihood of a decision to 
award damages and, if so, the size of such an award. An empirical study 
published in 2012 showed that prior to In re Seagate, which added the 
“evidence that infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood 
that its action constituted infringement” test to a finding of 
willfulness,128 judges and juries both found willful infringement at 
roughly equal rates (54% and 61%, respectively).129 However, in the 
years after Seagate, jury findings of willfulness remained at about the 
same rate (62%), while judicial findings of willfulness plummeted to 
less than 19%.130 While the sample size was not tremendous—there 
were only 111 post-Seagate determinations of willfulness in the study, 
only a small portion of which were judicial findings131—the difference 
may be statistically significant in suggesting that increased reliance on 
juries will result in more findings of willful infringement. However, 
part of the shift in willfulness findings is due to an increase in summary 
judgment findings as to willfulness, as well as JMOL findings of no 
willfulness.132 As such, some of the recently observed reduction in 
willfulness allegations ultimately resulting in an award of treble 
damages at trial would remain even if the jury’s role in the process was 
increased.133 
As to the size of a potential § 284 award, there is some evidence 
that juries are more likely to award punitive damages and also more 
likely to award such damages at the higher end of the allowable scale.134 
To that end, putting willfulness and enhanced damages findings in the 
hands of the jury will likely result in an increase in damages being 
awarded at the upper end of the allowable scale. However, unlike the 
copyright act, which provides little guidance on the amount of statutory 
damages for willful infringement (which under § 504(c) range from 
 
 128. In re Seagate, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc). 
 129. Christopher B. Seaman, Willful Patent Infringement & Enhanced Damages After In Re 
Seagate: An Empirical Study, 97 IOWA L. REV. 417, 445 (2012). Note that this data only looked 
at decisions at the district court level, however it includes final determinations under all procedural 
postures except default judgment. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. See id. at 440. 
 134. See, e.g., Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 127 (finding that most $100+ million punitive 
awards are the result of jury trials). 
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$750–$150,000 per act—or 200 times the base amount), there is a well-
established jurisprudence for determining patent damages that are 
rationally connected to the infringing activity and a willfulness finding 
can result in no more than a trebling of that amount. 
CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence regarding 35 U.S.C. § 284 
likely needs to be revisited, as recognized by at least two Federal 
Circuit judges.135 For at least the first 170 years after Congress provided 
discretion, judges did not require clear and convincing evidence to 
obtain treble damages for patent infringement. Additionally, the various 
statutes relating to this provision have never mentioned or called for 
this evidentiary standard. Further, the language Congress selected when 
drafting § 284 does not indicate an intent to adopt a common-law 
standard that exceeds the preponderance of the evidence.  
The Federal Circuit’s adoption of “clear and convincing 
evidence” for § 284 goes against the Supreme Court’s repetitions over 
the last forty years that civil litigation, even in the context of punitive 
remedies, should be governed by the preponderance of the evidence 
unless a governing statute requires otherwise. The proper standard of 
proof for § 284 is likely the preponderance of the evidence. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit’s recent holding in Bard, that the 
objective prong of a willfulness determination under § 284 is a question 
of law for the court subject to de novo review,136 should likely be 
reconsidered. The Bard court failed to justify its deviation from the 
long practice of treating willfulness as an issue of fact for the jury to 
resolve. Its statement that the judge is best suited to determine the 
objective reasonableness of the behavior of accused infringers, even 
when this determination is based on mixed questions of fact and law, is 
opposed by the longstanding American practice of putting that 
determination in the hands of the factfinder. The Bard court’s reliance 
on § 285 and PRE as justification for its holding is now likely 
unsupported in light of the Supreme Court’s recent opinions in 
Highmark and Octane.  
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Feltner on the award 
of statutory damages for willful copyright infringement suggests that 
not only should the factual predicate of willfulness be determined by a 
 
 135. Judge Hughes joined Judge O’Malley’s concurrence in Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Elecs., 
Inc., 769 F.3d 1371, 1383–86 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 136. Bard Peripheral Vascular, Inc. v. W.L. Gore & Assocs., 682 F.3d 1003, 1004–06 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012). 
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jury, but also that the decision of whether to award enhanced damages, 
and if so, the amount, is a task for the jury. 
Finally, there are several implications if these suggested changes 
to § 284 jurisprudence are adopted. A lowered standard of proof would 
likely increase willfulness findings, but it remains to be seen if this 
increase would offset the increased summary judgment findings and 
successful JMOLs dismissing willfulness that have taken place post-
Seagate. Similarly, a shift to relying on juries for enhanced damages 
determinations may also increase the likelihood of a willfulness 
finding, as well as the size of the damages awarded. Another possible 
effect is a decrease in abusive pre-trial tactics by defendants, for fear of 
the jury learning of them. Defendants might also be more willing to 
present evidence of a reliance on the advice of counsel to a jury, despite 
the jurisprudence dictating that this no longer creates an adverse 
inference. Fear of increased damages as set by a jury may incentivize 
defendants to make a greater effort to appear as the reasonable party 
who does not merit punishment. 
